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ABSTRACT 
How can practitioners engage in evidence-based practice when the evidence for effectiveness 
of psychological treatments comes from randomized controlled trials using patient 
populations different from those encountered in everyday settings and treatment manuals 
which seem oversimplified and inflexible?  We argue that important evidence about best 
practice comes from case-based research, which builds knowledge in a clinically useful 
manner and complements what is achieved by multivariate research methods.  We present a 
multidimensional model of the research process that includes clinical practice and case-based 
research as significant contributors.  We also summarize the principles of case-based research 
and provide examples of recent technical advances. Finally, we suggest ways in which 
practitioners can apply the case-based approach in researching and publishing their own 
cases, perhaps in collaboration with university-based researchers.    
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Terms such as “evidence-based practice” (EBP) (Institute of Medicine, 2001) and 
"empirically supported  treatment" (EST) (Chambless  & Hollon, 1998; Kendall, 1998; 
Lyddon & Jones, 2001; Reinecke & Clark, 2003)  deliver the important message that 
clinicians are accountable to their clients and need to have up-to-date information on which 
treatments have been shown to work. However, under the influence of particular ideological 
perspectives or market interests they can be appropriated by a rhetoric that promotes 
simplistic and misleading assumptions which create a number of dilemmas for practitioners.  
Many of these assumptions are rooted in an overemphasis on the results of randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) and a failure to recognize the significance of case-based research in 
the process of building clinical knowledge.  In this paper, we (1) present a model of clinical 
scientific inquiry which includes case-based research as a fundamental aspect,  (2) set out the 
principles of case-based research, (3) draw out what this means with respect to the nature of  
EBP, and (4) suggest how practitioners can contribute to the process through systematic 
studies of their own cases. 
 Some misunderstandings about the nature of EBP have their roots in the agendas of 
particular groups.  Psychological assessment and treatment is a business and since there is a 
great deal at stake in terms of financial gain and reputation, it is not surprising that scientific 
neutrality might sometimes be vulnerable (Miller, 1999).  For example, health insurance 
companies, in seeking to specify the treatment for specific diagnoses as precisely as possible 
to determine the minimum amount of treatment that can be expected to be effective, creates a 
market pressure for ESTs to be both short and standardized.  In addition, because one of the 
main forms of treatment funded by medical insurance is medication, there is pressure for 
ESTs in the form of psychotherapy to be evaluated in the same manner as pharmacotherapy 
treatments, by means of RCTs in which one or more treatments are pitted against each other 
and a placebo. Treatments are operationalized by means of a treatment manual that specifies 
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what is to be done in each session and how many sessions there will be. The advantage is that 
the effectiveness of a manualized treatment can be measured and compared with that of other 
manualized treatments; the disadvantage is that the manualized treatment may restrict 
flexibility in the adaptation of the treatment approach to specific aspects of the client's 
personality and circumstances.  
 Researchers may argue that giving up the flexibility that is a usual part of clinical 
practice is a small price to pay for the scientific benefit derived from the progressive and 
systematic development of manualized treatments (Wilson, Fairburn, & Agras, 1997).  
However, manuals used in outcome research are not universally welcomed by practitioners.  
Clinicians may feel that researchers are dictating how they should function in practice (Addis, 
2002; Schulte, Bochum, & Eifert, 2002) and point to an excessive emphasis on technique, 
inadequate attention to the working alliance and a failure to recognize the importance of 
clinical innovation and the expertise of the therapist (Carroll & Nuro, 2002).  At the same 
time, it is often mistakenly assumed that because a treatment is manualized it is fairly 
straightforward to administer.  In practice most manualized treatments depend on sound 
clinical skills on the part of practitioners. Clark (2000) reported that experienced therapists 
who attended a training workshop on delivering treatments for anxiety disorders, obtained 
markedly poorer outcomes than were obtained in the research studies.  Further "top-up" 
training was needed in order to get expertise to the required level. 
 The competitive atmosphere among representatives of different psychotherapy 
traditions also contributes to misleading claims and impressions with respect to the number of 
people who are actually helped by a treatment that has been shown to be of value in a RCT.  
In evaluating the effectiveness of cognitive therapy treatments, Clark (2000) used a joint 
probability index (p [patient accepts treatment] x p [patient responds to treatment] x p [patient 
does not relapse] and obtained these values: specific phobias (.71);  panic disorder (.68); 
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posttraumatic stress disorder (.40);  depression (.38); generalized anxiety disorder (.32).  The 
value for panic disorder is what would be obtained if 88% accepted treatment, 88% of those 
benefited and 88% of those did not relapse. The value for generalized anxiety disorder is 
what would be obtained if 70% of patients accepted, 70% of those responded, a 70% of those 
did not relapse. In the case of panic disorder, therefore, two thirds of patients achieve long 
term benefit, while for generalized anxiety, only one third do so.  These figures show that 
there is considerable room for improvement in current state-of-the-art treatments for many 
common disorders. 
 Another misleading impression that may be created is that unless a treatment has been 
tested in an RCT, it has no empirical basis whatsoever.  Although there is no doubt that the 
RCT provides a strong form of evidence that is difficult to refute, this does not mean that 
other types of evidence are not available or that those that are available are worthless.  After 
all, it would be wasteful to commit the considerable expense and effort involved in running 
RCTs on treatments for which there was not already a strong body of evidence regarding 
effectiveness.  Related to this is a common misuse of the term “empirical” in which it is 
implied that studies are only empirical if they employ a group comparison method using 
multivariate statistics.  Such usage is simply inaccurate. A study that is scientific, “comes to 
grips with ... empirical facts at some point and in some way and helps to make them more 
intelligible” (Philosophy of science, 2003).  Case-based methods are also empirical. Indeed, 
they usually preserve the complexity of the real life situation far better than multivariate 
studies in which the context and details of everyday clinical phenomena are easily obscured 
or lost altogether. When properly applied they confront empirical facts in a way that is often 
more direct than in applications of quantitative multivariate methods where individual 
experience is simplified and filtered through scales and operational definitions or distorted by 
 5
experimental manipulation (Bilsbury & Richman, 2002; Kline, 1998; Michell, 2000; Taylor 
& Bogdan, 1998). 
 
A holistic model of the development of clinical knowledge 
 The aim of this paper is to provide a balanced view of the nature of the evidence-base 
which should inform practice. Kiesler (1981, p. 213) argued that "research is a 
multidimensional enterprise requiring diverse talents and approaches, all of which have 
heuristic value," and Salkovskis (2002, p. 1) that the knowledge base that informs clinical 
practice "progresses through a multidimensional approach to clinical science."  This means 
that different research methods complement each other; case-based studies, multivariate 
studies, experimental studies and group comparison outcome designs each provide different 
kinds of evidence which contribute to the scientific process of developing useful knowledge.  
When the evidence from different kinds of studies is carefully evaluated and integrated, we 
are in a position to develop "empirically grounded clinical interventions" (Salkovskis, 2002) 
whose evidence base is not from a single outcome study, but from an integrated review of a 
range of different kinds of evidence. 
Figure 1 about here 
 The approach is presented in Figure 1. Applied clinical theory (E) is formulated under 
the respective influences of everyday clinical practice (A) and science (H).  Clinical practice, 
rather than being a poor relation to science, is conceived of as a significant partner in the 
process (see also Sackett, Rosenberg, Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996).  It encompasses a 
network of intersecting social and professional processes that include supervision, informal 
discussions with colleagues, case conference presentations and examination of current 
literature.  The submission of case reports for publication in peer-reviewed journals can 
further enhance the process. Although clinicians may act to reinforce each other's prejudices 
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(Strupp, 1981), in practice, case conferences attended by staff from varied training and 
professional backgrounds and with a commitment to a scientific attitude (H) provide 
opportunities to sort out the biases and expectations regarding treatment and interpretation 
that clinicians inevitably bring to their work (Miller, 1999).  Such professional activities, 
which have their counterparts in other disciplines, comprise one of the main contexts within 
which clinical theory is progressively refined.  This kind of theory draws little from formal 
experimental research (Jones, 1993; Stein, 1997), but is built from the ground up, so to speak, 
as clinicians formulate and revise their psychological understanding of their clients and 
construct models of the relevant psychological processes. 
 Clinical theory (E) provides the basis for the development of treatment models (D) for 
specific presenting problems or disorders.  These may be more or less tightly operationalized 
in manualized treatment protocols or as broader guidelines for practice. These models can, in 
turn, be tested in two ways: in intensive studies of new cases (B), and in RCTs (F) which 
provide a critical test of the value of all that has gone into the development of a treatment.  
Theory building has little value if treatments fail to help a significant number of individuals.  
In the end, clinical impressions, the rhetoric and hyperbole of the marketing team and 
enthusiasm for specialized healing discourses, whether medical or psychological must be 
tempered by the data and, if the treatment does not outperform the placebo, expect to be 
overhauled.  
 In the design of RCTs, steps are taken to maximize the possibility of obtaining 
evidence about treatment outcome. But this limits their usefulness for testing propositions 
about the processes involved in achieving treatment outcome.  Where two contrasting 
treatments are shown to be equally effective, a study may provide no information as to 
whether they worked in a similar or a different manner. Yet, as scientists and clinicians, we 
not only want to predict the outcome of treatments, we want to understand how they work so 
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that we can adapt them to new situations.  If sufficient dependent measures are administered 
as part of a RCT, some clinical hypotheses can be tested.  For example, Teasdale et al. (2001) 
showed that risk of relapse in depressed clients, whether treated with medication or with 
medication plus cognitive therapy, was associated with extreme responding (in either 
direction) on various measures of cognitive distortions and cognitive style.  However, 
findings from RCTs are usually rather broad in character and there is a limit to what 
questions can be answered about the actual processes that occurred during treatment. 
 Case-based studies (B) enable us to refine clinical treatment models as well as to test 
and refine the theory on which the models are based. They provide answers to more detailed 
questions about process, since they allow for the gathering of extensive information in the 
form of repeated quantitative measures as well as qualitative information about the process of 
each session and relevant events between sessions, such as the response to homework 
assignments.  Information with regard to the point at which significant change occurred and 
what the client experienced as producing significant cognitive, behavioral or emotional shifts 
allows for detailed  testing of  the clinical model on which the treatment is based (Bates & 
Clark, 1998; Stiles, 2003; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1997). 
 Clinical interventions can further be empirically grounded by experimental studies 
(C) that test aspects of the underlying theory.  Such studies are advancing our understanding 
of the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder (Ehlers & Clark, 2000;  
Harvey & Bryant, 1999).  When the findings of experimental studies are in accord with 
theory derived from clinical practice, they enhance confidence regarding the underlying 
rationale for the treatment.  The overall context of science (H) with its carefully formulated 
principles for deriving valid knowledge from empirical data, directly influences the 
knowledge building process by informing case conceptualization and evaluation of response 
to treatment within clinical practice (A), as well as the design of research studies, whether 
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case-based (B), experimental tests (C), or RCTs (F).  Clinical theory is also influenced by 
concepts and theories derived from related scientific fields (G), for example, concepts from 
cognitive science (Bowlby, 1979; Horowitz, 1988; Stein, 1997;  Teasdale, 1997) and 
evolutionary theory (Gilbert, 2002; Kriegman, 1998; Langs, 1996) have influenced theories 
of therapists of varying orientations. 
 
The complementarity of case-based and multivariate group comparison research 
 Case-based research uses a variety of methodologies. Although "case study" may 
broadly refer to any of these, there are many other terms in use.  Hilliard (1993) uses the term 
“case study” where the data are in the form of a narrative and methods of analysis are 
qualitative.  Where the focus is on repeated quantitative measures of one or more variables, 
he uses the term “single-case experiments” where the independent variable is directly 
manipulated, or “single-case quantitative analysis”, where there is no such manipulation.  
Such studies are also referred to as N=1 designs (Kratochwill, Mott, & Dodson, 1984).  We 
use the term "case-based research" (Edwards, 1998) because we prefer not to make a rigid 
distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods.  Studies that use a case narrative in 
conjunction with repeated quantitative measures (e.g., Edwards, Henwood, & Kannan, 2003) 
allow for multiple strategies for investigating and testing hypotheses. 
 Although case-based methods became progressively marginalized during the latter 
half of the twentieth century,  they retained a measure of recognition, especially in clinical 
psychology  (Bromley, 1986, 1990; Hayes, 1981; Kazdin, 1981; Shapiro, 1970; Kratochwill, 
Mott, & Dodson, 1984) and currently there is a resurgence of appreciation of their value 
(Barker, Pistrang, & Elliott, 1994; Edwards, 1996, 1998;  Hilliard, 1993; Jones, 1993; Stake, 
1995; Stiles, 2003;  Yin, 1994). Unfortunately, however, recognition of their scientific 
significance has been undermined by a classic dichotomy between an exploratory "context of 
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discovery" (Giorgi, 1986), that employs methods that generate ideas and hypotheses and 
provide a preliminary conceptualization of a phenomenon, and a "context of verification", 
which uses tightly designed experimental studies to enhance the possibility of establishing 
causal relationships between dependent and independent variables.  In this view, case studies 
are represented as valuable in the discovery phase, for example when examining disorders 
that feature infrequently in the literature, yet are prevalent enough for clinicians and 
researchers to require some direction (Dattilio, 2003).  However, they are accorded only a 
limited role in the verification phase because of alleged difficulties in generalizing from 
them. They are therefore represented as a less advanced form of scientific enquiry (Kazdin, 
1981; Kiesler, 1981). 
 This view seriously misrepresents the potential of case-based research, which can 
significantly contribute to hypothesis testing and theory development (Bromley, 1990; 
Campbell, 1994; Jones, 1993; Mahrer, 1988).  Eckstein (1975) provides a classic example of 
how  a "crucial case study" (p. 113) settled a longstanding scientific dispute. According to 
Aristotle, the heavier an object the faster it falls.  According to Galileo, all objects fall at the 
same velocity and acceleration unless affected by other conditions such as air pressure.  
"Only with the invention of the air pump, about 1650, was a definitive experiment possible: 
dropping a heavy object (coin) and a light one (feather) in an evacuated tube" (p. 115). Only a 
single observation was needed to establish that Galileo was right.  Well designed case studies 
in the field of psychotherapy can provide similar crucial tests which have "an inherent 
persuasiveness that tends to prompt one to revise or refine theory" (Moras, Telfer, &  Barlow, 
1993, p. 419).  This is not to claim that observations within cases can test all hypotheses, or 
to deny that many hypotheses are best tested by group comparison designs using randomized 
samples.   
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  Unfortunately, observations from case studies that do not conform to hypotheses 
supported by multivariate studies are routinely dismissed as "anecdotal."  This term betrays 
an ignorance of the fact that the underlying logic through which clinical knowledge is built 
up from cases is different from that used in the interpretation of multivariate studies. 
“Viewing single-case research along the same lines as group research is highly misleading,” 
observes Hilliard (1993, p. 373).  It uses a complementary system of argument that is as 
central to science as the logic of testing theory using multivariate methodology. Hilliard 
(1993) identifies two features that anchor the logic of case-based knowledge building. The 
first feature is a focus is on intrasubject rather than intersubject variation.  Case-based 
research is largely longitudinal in nature and allows for the examination of the detailed 
unfolding of events across time (Jones, 1993; Jones, Ghannam, Nigg, & Dyer, 1993). 
Psychotherapy outcomes as investigated in RCTs are a consequence of a series of smaller 
change events within individual cases, and intensive case analysis allows us "to discover how 
the therapist's interventions and patient's responses (i.e., the therapeutic process) contribute to 
or explain these smaller changes" (Hilliard, 1993, p. 374). These processes cannot be 
examined by means of cross-sectional group comparison studies. 
 The second feature is that generalization is not based on aggregation across cases (as 
occurs when statistics such as a mean or correlation coefficient are calculated from a sample), 
but on replication on a case-by-case basis (Moras et al., 1993).  Stiles (2003) points out that 
although "isolated descriptive statements drawn from a case study can't be confidently 
generalized," when a large number of observations from the case correspond with what is 
already present in the theory, the evidence gained is as persuasive as that obtained in studies 
using statistical hypothesis testing: 
A few systematically analyzed cases that match a theory in precise or 
unexpected detail may give people considerable confidence in the theory as a 
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whole even though each component assertion may remain tentative and 
uncertain" (p. 7). 
 The first step in theory building is to document a process in one case. The next step is 
to demonstrate the same process in similar cases.  After that, other cases are sought that differ 
in important respects, or within which it might be expected that different processes might 
take place. In this way, a theoretical structure of distinctions, principles and hypotheses is 
formulated and progressively refined to account for the whole range of phenomena observed 
in all cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This procedure corresponds to the way cases are 
accumulated in jurisprudence that provides a convincing method of organizing knowledge 
through generalizing and testing hypotheses based on case studies. Using this analogy, the 
resulting theory can be termed "case law" (Bromley, 1986).  In principle, the process is the 
same as the development of what Fishman (1999) terms “pragmatic psychology” and Strauss 
and Corbin (1994) call "grounded theory".  All these authors emphasize the evidence-based 
nature of the theory that is generated in this way: is grounded in the data of cases, it is 
testable against new cases and its generalizations are lawful relationships between 
operationalized phenomena that have been observed and replicated. Furthermore, it has 
immediate practical application since it is not obscure or removed from the phenomena that it 
addresses. 
 Several other strategies are used in theory building to combat factors that might lead 
to erroneous conclusions.  Conclusions must be established on the basis of a valid chain of 
reasoning linked to empirical data (Yin, 1994).  "Plausible rival hypotheses" must be 
identified and eliminated by means of examining "extended networks of implications" in the 
case in question as well as in other cases (Campbell, 1994, p. ix). The extent to which this 
can be done depends on the quality and extensiveness of the data that has so far been 
collected. Because human life is so rich and complex, it seems probable that in any specific 
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area of psychopathology and treatment there will always be room for new observations 
within cases that will contribute to and extend theory.  This kind of clinical knowledge 
building cannot be achieved through group comparison research (Kratochwill, Mott & 
Dodson, 1984; Miller, 1998).  It is no exaggeration to claim that the study of cases is the 
"bedrock of scientific investigation" (Bromley, 1986, p. ix), and, as Mahrer (1988, p. 697) 
observes, it is a mistake to dismiss it as "a somewhat useful secondary tool for the serious 
work of scientific hypothesis testing." 
 While the value of case-based research has been seriously underestimated, significant 
problems associated with multivariate studies have tended to be ignored.  Like any other 
research method, quantitative group comparison studies are vulnerable to error through 
mistakes, carelessness, or dubious practices during their design, administration, or 
interpretation.   The technology involved rests on many assumptions, including the 
measurement assumptions underlying the original data, and the assumptions underlying the 
subsequent statistical analysis. It is widely recognized that these assumptions are not always 
met. It is also easy to forget that the numbers assigned when we score psychological 
attributes such as a person's compliance or resolve are not "quantitative" in the strict sense of 
that word (Kline, 1998; Michell, 2000).  There is no objective anchoring as is the case with 
measures of objective attributes, such as mass, memory span, or performance on a task.   In a 
typical standardized test, the meaning of the numbers depends on understanding how the 
psychological attributes have been defined and assessed, and the variables that are measured 
are constructions embedded within the complex assumptions of the theories that gave rise to 
them. A more important limitation is that psychometric scales, because they are designed to 
measure properties that can be measured in a stable manner in heterogeneous populations,  
have limited application to the experiences of individuals and may be insensitive to actual 
clinical changes in response to psychotherapy (Bilsbury & Richman, 2002).  None of this is 
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said to discredit research based on multivariate statistics and psychometric scales.  Indeed, 
both are increasingly used within the case-based research paradigm (Moras, et al., 1993; 
Spence, Dahl, & Jones, 1993). It is rather to emphasise Kiesler’s (1981, p. 213) point that "all 
research is flawed ... scientific progress results from repeated empirical attacks on a problem 
... no single study ... is worth much in and of itself".   
 Nevertheless the limitations of case-based research have been so exaggerated that 
remarkably few studies are published.  Electronic database searches of psychology and 
psychiatry journals for the 25-year period from 1978 to 2003 yielded 6091 case studies from 
PsychINFO and 15,433 from Medline: fewer than 1000 case studies per year. This 
remarkably low figure is a consequence of the hegemony of the perspective that privileges 
methodologies using multivariate statistics at the expense of case-based research and reflects 
the difficulty in obtaining funding for case-based research (Moras et al., 1993, p. 417). The 
marginalization of case-based research also contributes to an alienation between  researcher 
and practitioner that has been widely commented on (Barlow, 1981; Chambless & Hollon, 
1998; Clark & Reinecke, 2003; Dattilio, 2002a; Lyddon & Jones, 2001; Safran, Greenberg, & 
Rice, 1988; Silverman, 2001; Strupp, 1981).   As Jones (1993, p. 371), observed, "much of 
the therapy research enterprise has remained peripheral to clinical practice and to the major 
theoretical and intellectual currents in the field." Case studies in narrative format engage 
readers meaningfully with the material. Through seeing how treatment actually unfolds they 
can rapidly integrate the implications into their own explicit and implicit frameworks of 
clinical knowledge.  By contrast, research results in the form of descriptive and inferential 
statistics may be much more difficult to assimilate.  This intrinsic appeal is often interpreted 
to mean that although individual cases may be valuable in education and training, they are of 
limited scientific significance. We argue that the value of case studies in training is a 
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consequence of their scientific value and follows from the fact that in practice they do yield 
valid knowledge.  
 
Case study standards and the art and science of case reports 
In practice, case-based  theory has been at the heart of the development of many particular 
interventions used in RCTs of psychotherapy treatments.  For example, the kinds of 
principles and detailed interventions used in trials of cognitive therapy were described by 
Beck and his collaborators some 20 years ago (Beck & Emery, 1985; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979) on the basis of close observations of individual cases, and have been 
progressively modified and refined ever since, to address an ever widening range of clinical 
presentations.  However, the case database for this kind of theory building has been largely 
implicit.  Few cases are actually reported in the literature in a way that enables their 
contribution to theory building to be objectively assessed. Most are not reported on at all, 
while others appear in reduced form as brief case examples of particular clinical phenomena.  
 The case-based research process would best be served by developing such databases 
as an explicit public reference point.  This would require the publication of more case studies, 
and the development of a generally accepted philosophical and practical infrastructure for 
case study methodology analogous to that of traditional experimental and quantitative 
research (Miller, 1999). This infrastructure would include consensually agreed guidelines for 
the construction of case-based reports that would ensure that their scientific value in the 
generation and testing of theory.  Models for case reports can be found in the collections of 
case studies that have long been a regular feature of the clinical literature (e.g., Blackburn & 
Twaddle, 1996;  Freeman and Dattilio, 1992).  The recently founded journal, Clinical Case 
Studies prescribes a format that includes: theoretical and research basis, case introduction, 
presenting complaints, history, assessment, case conceptualization, course of treatment and 
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assessment of progress, complicating factors, follow-up, treatment implications of the case 
and recommendations to clinicians and students.  
 However, the composition of reports is time-consuming and calls for a high level of 
skill and even artistry, because a large amount of material has to be organized and reduced to 
manageable proportions. Conceptual routines for describing prototypical cases can be 
acquired through training and experience (Bromley, 1991). This involves a "knowledge 
transforming" process (Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987) through which the raw data of the case 
are selected and structured thematically in terms of clinically relevant concepts and questions 
and integrated into accepted knowledge structures. 
 Communities of clinicians and researchers who share a common discourse build a 
shared conceptual and procedural framework that enhances communication and mutual 
understanding.  Within this evolve scientific and professional standards regarding the 
procedures involved in data collection, report writing, treatment planning and evaluation of 
outcome.  For example, in cognitive-behavior therapy, case material is typically organized in 
terms of the predisposing, precipitating and maintaining factors that are understood to have 
contributed or to be contributing to the presenting problems.  In addition, attention is paid to 
particular psychological processes such as automatic thoughts, underlying assumptions, core 
beliefs and the manner in which these interact with specific experiences and behaviors to 
create positive feedback loops or chronically self-defeating patterns (Leahy, 1996, Chapter 
10; Tompkins, 1997).  Although psychodynamic case formulations may focus more on 
predisposing factors in terms of effects of early parental relationships and identification with 
parents (Silberschatz & Curtis, 1993), there are marked similarities between psychodynamic 
and cognitive-behavioral formulations (Persons, Curtis, & Silberschatz, 1991). 
 A case formulation approach can contribute towards the overall coherence of the 
report, that is to the general credibility of the argument and the extent to which the account is 
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relevant, systematic, complete and without internal contradiction.  Coherence is achieved by 
focusing on a limited number of main points, offering arguments for and/or against particular 
assertions, providing examples to illustrate a point, offering background information to 
bolster the points being made, resolving apparent contradictions in the account, explaining 
omissions in the data, making evaluations of the validity or utility of the information 
presented and showing the connections among different aspects of the case.  Case 
formulation can also contribute to a report’s cohesion, that it, the extent to which the ideas 
expressed in different sections of the text are thematically and theoretically connected.  Any 
case report is inevitably compiled as a linear sequence of words, even though it must 
somehow express a range of technical ideas that interlock in complex ways. Cohesion can 
also be attained by means of tables and diagrams to depict theoretical relationships or 
practical connections. 
 
Improving the quality of case-based evidence 
 Because their construction is a complex process, the evidential value of case reports 
has been criticized. It has been claimed that they are always deeply influenced by the 
subjectivity of the author and that there is an inevitable selection and "narrative smoothing" 
that shapes the material to favor the writer's preferred conclusions (Spence, 1986). Critics 
also argue that authors of case reports often reach conclusions that cannot be sustained when 
subjected to critical scrutiny, and the clinical theory on which conclusions are based may 
itself be speculative and riddled with untestable hypotheses and ungrounded generalizations.   
It is an overreaction to use the existence of some poorly argued case studies as a basis for 
discrediting all case-based research.  Provided that the principles of case-based knowledge 
building can be articulated and more widely understood, consensus can develop about what 
generalizations can be sustained from a series of case studies. Like all researchers, those 
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using case-based methodologies must build in strategies for safeguarding accuracy, checking 
replicability and ensuring the validity of arguments.  In psychotherapy research this can be 
achieved by making sure that all sessions are tape-recorded, using independent judges to 
check that the reduction of the raw data into case narratives is not biased by a customized 
selection of material and employing self-report scales or behavioral observations that are 
repeatedly collected throughout the study to provide an additional information source against 
which to interpret the meaning of developments within the case narrative (Barker, Pistrang & 
Elliot, 1994; Kazdin, 1981; Petermann & Müller, 2001; Safran, Crocker, McMain, & Murray, 
1990; Silberschatz & Curtis, 1993). 
 Recent technical advances in approaches to data collection and analysis can greatly 
enhance the degree to which accuracy, replicability and validity can be established.  Bilsbury 
and Richman (2002) argue that changes in a clinical condition are better revealed by a 
patient's assessment of his or her progress (or regress) than by psychometric measures of 
abstract constructs. Psychological disorders have a "natural history;" a series of qualitative 
stages can be identified from the first indications and progressing to its climax. Similarly, 
recovery from a disorder has a reverse natural history as the patient progresses through a 
series of stages from the first signs of remission to full or partial recovery.  The sequence 
may be unique from case to case and therefore will be imperfectly tracked by 
psychometrically derived measures. Idiographic rating scales can be constructed that reflect 
the categories used by clients themselves to describe their own experience and which address 
phenomena of direct clinical relevance within the specific case.  Repeated use of such a scale 
provides a record of response to treatment that is likely to be more sensitive than one using  
standard psychometric scales. 
 Independent judges can rate recorded psychotherapy sessions using a Q-sort method 
which "can capture the uniqueness of each therapy hour as well as permit the assessment of 
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similarities and dissimilarities of one treatment hour to another" (Jones et al., 1993, p. 384). 
Data across a large number of sessions can be factor analyzed to identify process dimensions 
that characterize the case.  Factor scores reflecting these process dimensions can, in turn, be 
submitted to time series analysis to reveal complex patterns of relationship among variables 
within the therapy.  In this way, Jones et al. demonstrated aspects of the reciprocal influence 
of therapist and patient over the course of therapy. 
 In two studies, the psychoanalytic construct of defensiveness was operationalized and 
measured.  Using judges’ ratings of recordings of sessions, Horowitz et al. (1993) were able 
to establish that, when discussing a particular emotionally distressing event, the patient 
showed a distinctive pattern that included more limited verbal elaboration accompanied by 
non-verbal markers of emotionality, non-verbal attempts to ward off threat, such as hiding his 
face and avoiding gaze and lower heart rate (probably associated with inhibition of emotional 
expression). Spence et al. (1993) used a measure of associative strength between nouns for a 
time series analysis of sessions of a long psychoanalytic psychotherapy.  It was hypothesized 
that a high co-occurrence rate (COR) of associated words indicated a less defensive style and 
more associative freedom on he part of the patient. In the early stages of the therapy, the 
therapist's interpretations tended to reduce COR (i.e. increase patient defensiveness), whereas 
later in the therapy, as the relationship between patient and therapist became more intimate, 
the client responded to interpretation with more associative freedom. 
 A case-comparison method described by Ragin (1987) provides for the analysis of 
nominal attributes across a set of cases. Cases are classified into types according to which 
combination of attributes they possess. The relationship is examined between each 
combination and a particular outcome, such as fulfilling or not fulfilling a clinical prediction. 
An investigator interested in four attributes would tabulate all possible 16 combinations, 
ranging from all absent to all present and the available cases would be classified in terms of 
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their own particular combinations of attributes.  Next, the outcome (success, failure, or 
ambiguous) for each combination is recorded. With a small number of attributes, the 
relationships between the outcomes and the various combinations of attributes are likely to be 
obvious by inspection. With a large number of attributes, Boolean algebra is used to clarify 
the relationships. 
 
Conclusions and recommendations 
What does all this mean for evidence-based practice?  Sackett, one of the significant 
contributors to the development of the concept, defined it as “the conscientious, explicit and 
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual 
patients, [which] means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available 
external clinical evidence from systematic research” (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 71).  Thus, in 
respect of each case they treat, practitioners have the responsibility of evaluating the current 
research evidence from multivariate experimental and outcome studies on the one hand and 
case-based research on the other.  As we have seen, the research processes that contribute to 
the development of clinical knowledge are interdependent and none can be carved out of the 
overall system and privileged as "more scientific."  Clinical knowledge calls for judicious use 
of a combination of research methods that complement and cross check each other.  
Practitioners must find a means of weighing in a considered manner the different kinds of 
evidence each contributes.  The disadvantage of drawing purely on clinical experience is well 
known:  it is easy to be misled about the particular aspects of one’s practice that bring about 
positive change. A salutary warning is provided when a RCT shows that a particular 
treatment does no better than placebo. However, where a RCT shows that a treatment is more 
effective than placebo it may tell us only that the treatment includes something important. It 
is the preceding case-based studies that investigate the detailed processes on which treatment 
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effectiveness depends. A limitation of multivariate studies is that the statistical procedures 
they employ deduce the properties of a population from those of a sample; they cannot 
deduce from a sample the properties of individual cases (Bilsbury & Richman, 2002). Yet 
this is what practitioners need to know. The RCT that shows that a treatment helps 40 percent 
of clients does not tell me if the client who enters my office today is one of them. Although 
they can identify broad predictor variables (gender, age, co-morbid diagnoses, personality 
traits), these tend to be of limited clinical usefulness.  Case-based research can provide a 
therapist with more differentiated knowledge with respect to aspects of clients’ motivation, 
attitude or belief that are likely to impact on engagement with treatment and with respect to 
how to respond effectively to the details of clients’ emotions, thoughts and behavior as the 
treatment unfolds. 
 Finally, we offer recommendations that help to bridge the gap between practitioner 
and researcher. First, we would encourage active collaboration between practitioners and 
university-based researchers.  Where practitioners do not have the time to do so, there may be 
opportunities for Master’s and Doctoral students to turn the raw data of a carefully 
documented case into a scientific case study. Second, it is important to conceptualize cases 
within the framework of current case law. The current literature provides many clear 
statements of the state of case law with respect to particular DSM-IV mental disorders as well 
as specific clinical problems.  Third, be on the look out for cases that can be treated in terms 
of current case law and which enable specific aspects of it to be tested.  Fourth, document the 
assessment and treatment of each case by systematically summarizing information, keeping 
tape-recordings of sessions and using self-report measures that can be completed at each 
session (Bilsbury & Richman, 2002; Parry, Shapiro, & Firth, 1986; Petermann & Müller, 
2001). Fifth, within the process of treatment, investigate the claims of existing theory and pay 
attention to obstacles to treatment or processes that call for extension of what is presented in 
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research treatment manuals. Studies of treatment failures are of particular value in this regard 
(Barlow, 1981; Foa & Emmelkamp, 1983).  The literature on personality disorders and 
motivational interviewing (e.g. Newman & Ratto, 2003; Miller & Rollnick, 1991; Young, 
Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003) already contains a great deal of case-based knowledge about 
obstacles to treatment progress as well as strategies for addressing them. Sixth, investigate 
the extent to which a research-based treatment (with its special training for practitioners, 
detailed manuals and supervisory support) is “transportable” to real world settings where 
resources are limited, practitioners have less than ideal levels of training and the client 
population is more diverse than in the research studies (Schoenwald & Hoagwood, 2001). 
Seventh, use the case-based model as a framework for writing case studies for publication 
either in journals such as Clinical Case Studies or specialist journals which address the 
specific areas of clinical concern relevant to the case (e.g. Bates & Clark, 1998; Dattilio, 
2002b, 2003; Dattilio & Castaldo, 2001; Edwards et al., 2003; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1997).  
If these recommendations can be applied, practitioners can play a meaningful role in 
furnishing the "data that have been missing to date from traditional clinical research" 
(Barlow, 1981, p. 153) and, in so doing, providing a resource that is essential for the conduct 
of a genuine and responsible evidence-based practice. 
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